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required not only to prove that the proposed subtenant meets reasonable
commercial standards of credit and reputation but also to disprove any
particular allegations that the landlord's interests would be damaged by the
proposed subtenancy. This solution allows the landlord to protect his legit-
imate business interests and to meet the legal requirements of care in tenant
selection, for he can still, in the exercise of reasonable discretion, reject a
truly undesirable subtenant. At the same time it relieves the tenant from
unnecessary hardship and permits more efficient utilization of the community's
economic resources.
§1057, at 280 (1951). Similarly, a clause which exempts a party from his obligation to avoid
damages should not be enforced since justice does not require compensation for harm
needlessly suffered.
COLLECTION CAPERS: LIABILITY FOR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
The legality of widespread debt collection practices has been a fertile and
ever-increasing source of controversy. The creditor, or more commonly a
collection agency, may continually hound the debtor with threats ranging
from the institution of legal proceedings to the economic and social pressure
afforded by exposure of the debtor's financial circumstances to others. More-
over, as illustrated by several recent cases, these threats are in many instances
carried out.' This comment will discuss the existing legal restrictions on such
collection activity with the aim of delineating the boundaries of permissible
conduct.
Unauthorized Practice of Law
The creditor seeking payment will often enlist the services of a commercial
collection agency. Conflict between certain practices followed by these agen-
cies and the efforts of the bar to eliminate lay competition forms a focal point
for present legal dispute.2 When such conflict exists, the sanction may be
formidable. The layman who is held to be engaged in the unauthorized prac-
'For descriptions of collection activity consult, e.g., Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133
N.E.2d 340 (1956), noted in 7 West. Res. L. Rev. 461 (1956), and 2 Wayne L. Rev. 240
(1956); Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). Consult also
Butterfield, Collection Agencies and the Courts, 5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 47 (1938) ; Birk-
head, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 78 (1941) ; Otterbourg,
Collection Agency Activities: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Bar, 5 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 35 (1938) ; Nugent, Devices for Liquidating Small Claims in Detroit, 2 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 259 (1935); Harris, Improper Methods of Collecting Debts, 58 Corn.
L. J. 5 (1953).
2 Consult Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Power
Groups, 4 Kan. L. Rev. 1 (1955), for an exhaustive treatment. Closely analogous to activi-
ties of the American Bar Association in this regard are the activities of the American Med-
ical Association, discussed in The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and
Policies in Organized Medicine, 63 Yale L. 3. 938 (1954).
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tice of law will be enjoined from continuing such activities under penalty of
fine or even imprisonment,3 or possibly found in contempt of court.4
As a general rule, the collection agency, insofar as it is a lay organization,
may not represent the creditor in court.5 Furthermore, this prohibition may
not be circumvented by a nominal assignment of the claim in such a manner
as to entitle the agency to proceed as an apparent real party in interest. 6
Some jurisdictions, however, permit lay employees of agencies to act as
"attorneys" before justice of the peace "courts" either because of the techni-
cal view that such a tribunal is not a court at all 7 or because of authorization
by special statute."
Collection agencies may also engage in the unauthorized practice of law by
advising creditors with respect to legal matters 9 or by drafting legal instru-
ments for them. 10 The test generally applied in this area is whether or not
the activity in question requires for its proper performance techniques, skills
E.g., Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d 605 (Fla., 1950).
' E.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1
(1935).
'See, e.g., Depew v. Wichita Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc., 142 Kan. 403, 49 P.2d 1041
(1935). Laymen apparently never seek to represent other lay persons in court. But dis-
barred attorneys, or attorneys not admitted in the state in which they appear, prove the
rule when they seek to appear in court in a representative capacity. Petition of Kearney,
63 So.2d 630 (Fla., 1953); Horne v. Bridwell, 193 Va. 381, 68 S.E.2d 535 (1952); People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Novotny, 386 Ill. 536, 54 N.E.2d 536 (1944). Principle (1) of
the Joint Statement of Principles issued by the American Bar Ass'n Committee on The
Unauthorized Practice of Law and Representatives of Collection Agencies, May 4, 1937,
printed in II Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory 105A (88th ed., 1956), provides: "It is
improper for a collection agency (1) to furnish legal advice or to perform legal services or
to represent that it is competent to do so; or to institute judicial proceedings on behalf of
other persons."
'Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Finance System, Inc., 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W.2d 23 (1956).
Accord: Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634 (1944); Bump v. Barnett, 235
Iowa 308, 16 N.W.2d 579 (1944). Cf. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 406 11.
253, 94 N.E.2d 148 (1950). But cf. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Merchants' R. & A. Co.,
183 Vash. 611, 49 P.2d 26 (1935). Consult 17 Unauthorized Practice News, No. 4, at 57
(1951).
Consult United Securities Corp. v. Pantex Pressing Mach., Inc., 98 Colo. 79, 53 P.2d
653 (1935); Rehm v. Cumberland Coal Co., 169 Md. 365, 181 Atl. 724 (1935). For the
majority view disqualifying lay persons from appearing in a representative capacity even
before justice of the peace courts, consult, e.g., State ex rel. Hunter v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625,
276 N.W. 380 (1937); State ex re]. Dist. Atty. v. Lytton, 172 Tenn. 91, 110 S.W.2d 313
(1937). A similar exclusion applies to the probate court. In re Root, 173 Kan. 512, 249
P.2d 628 (1952) ; Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939).
1 E.g., Wis. Stat. (1955) § 301.20, discussed in Can A Person Other Than a Licensed At-
torney Practice in Justice Court? [1948] Wis. L. Rev. 537.
9 Consult, e.g., State ex rel. Fatzer v. Schmitt, 174 Kan. 581, 258 P.2d 228 (1953) (trust
advisory service) ; Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934) (claims adjuster
advised and negotiated settlements).
"
0 Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Gentry, reported in 20 Unauthorized Practice News, No. 1, at
18 (1954) (Dist. Ct., Okla., 1953) (garnishment affidavits and bills of particulars). A case
reported in 17 Unauthorized Practice News, No. 3, at 36 (1951), involved a fine of $800
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and training typically associated with the legal profession,' As sometimes
stated, it is the character of the act and not whether it was performed before
a court which is controlling.' 2 Thus, it has been held that a collection agency
may complete blank notes, drafts, mortgage forms and similar forms obtain-
able at any bookstore if filling them out requires no special legal knowledge. 13
On the other hand there are many cases which hold that selection of the
proper form and its completion by a lay person is unauthorized because it
requires legal skill and knowledge.14
There is, however, an important qualification to the general "legal skills"
test. Many courts state that a layman may engage in what are otherwise legal
activities if these activities are "incidental to his regular calling."'' So stated,
upon a Wisconsin collector under the Wisconsin Collection Agency Licensing Law (§ 256.30
[2]) for obtaining and causing to be issued an execution on a judgment already entered.
Consult also Yount v. Zarbell, 17 Wash.2d 278, 135 P.2d 309 (1943) (pleadings); Depew
v. Wichita Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc., 142 Kan. 403, 49 P.2d 1041 (1935) (preparing bills
of particulars and intervening petitions). Consult Statement of Principles, loc. cit. supra
note 5. The rule is one of wide application. Thus, it has been held illegal for realtors to
prepare deeds, contracts of sale, mortgages and notes. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Wash-
ington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash.2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952) (deeds); Keyes Co. v.
Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d 605 (Fla., 1950) (deeds, leases and mortgages, but a
realtor may prepare contracts of sale) ; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer,
404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949) (contracts, deeds, mortgages and notes). It has likewise
been held illegal for banks and trust companies to prepare wills, trusts, etc. Hobson v. Ken-
tucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 197 S.W.2d 454 (1946) (deeds and wills, at least if compen-
sation is demanded). And it is unlawful for independent claims adjusters to prepare con-
tracts settling claims. State ex rel. Junior Ass'n of Milwaukee Bar v. Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 294
N.W. 550 (1940). It is also unlawful for title or abstract companies to prepare title opinions,
deeds or similar instruments. Steer v. Land Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 763
(Ohio C.P., 1953). But cf. La Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 368 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246
(1948) (title companies may draft instruments collateral to the insuring of titles). Patent
agents may not prepare patent applications, assignments, leases, etc. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Kellogg, 338 Ill.App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949). Contra: Marshall v. New Inventors Club,
Inc., 117 N.E.2d 737 (Ohio C.P., 1953).
"
1 Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619 (Cal. Super.Ct., 1954) ; Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn.
468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951); Stack v. P. G. Garage, Inc., 7 N.J. 118, 80 A.2d 545 (1951).
"Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 AUt. 20 (1937) ; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937); In re Ripley, 109 Vt. 83, 191 At. 918 (1937).
One court has suggested that community custom is significant. Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb,
315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943).
" Depew v. Wichita Ass'n of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P.2d 1041 (1935).
"Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash.2d 697, 251 P.2d
619 (1952) (realtor); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill.App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519
(1949) (patent agent) ; In re Gore, 58 Ohio App. 79, 15 N.E.2d 968 (1937) (realtor). To
the effect that there is no basis for distinguishing between simple and complex instruments
see Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946
(1944); People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E.2d 30 (1940); L. Meisel &
Co. v. National Jewelers Board of Trade, 90 Misc. 19, 152 N.Y.Supp. 913 (S.Ct., 1915).
'Petitions of Ingham County Bar Ass'n, 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955) ; Hulse v.
Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952); Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d
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this rule would appear to conflict with the "legal skills" test, for it may be
assumed that in most instances the layman's activities are related to his usual
business. Alternatively, the "incidental" test would appear to mean that if
the layman is deemed to possess, by reason of the nature of his business,
what are legal skills and techniques, then he may properly use these abilities
and will not be found to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. In
fact, such a view seems in harmony with the justification generally advanced
to support the "monopoly" given lawyers as to the practice of law: protection
of the public from the ignorant and unscrupulous "through the requirement
of high standards of preparation and ability."'16 Thus, it has been held that
banks,' 7 realtors' 8 and tax advisers'9 may perform many tasks involving
relatively complex legal problems. As applied to collection agencies, the "in-
cidental" test may therefore afford some leeway for the drafting of instruments
and giving of advice concerning matters which are closely associated with
debt collection.
The collection agency may attempt to avoid the effect of the rules prohibit-
ing it from going to court or otherwise engaging in lawyer-like activity through
an arrangement whereby attorneys are employed to handle the legal matters
incident to the claims solicited by the agency. Such an arrangement, wide-
spread though it may be, is fraught with legal dangers. Thus, a partnership
agreement under which claims are solicited by lay members of a firm and
suits are brought thereon by an attorney member has been held void and
unenforceable by reason of the public policy against lay practice of law.2 0
Similarly, the employment of attorneys by an agency on a commission basis
for the bringing of suit has been held to constitute the unauthorized practice
of law.
21
605 (Fla., 1950); State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941);
Gustafson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941); Cain v.
Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936) ; Childs v. Smeltzer,
315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934).
1 Dade County Bar Ass'n v. Keyes Company, C.C. of Dade County, Fla., No. 110, 350-A
(1949) (not officially reported), quoted at length in 15 Unauthorized Practice News, No. 1,
at 8 (1949), reversed in part, 46 So.2d 605 (Fla., 1950).
" E.g., Cain v. Merchants Nat1 Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936).
'E.g., Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d 605 (Fla., 1950) (realtor may
prepare contracts of sale, but not deeds, leases and mortgages); Cowern v. Nelson, 207
Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940) (closing instruments, if drafted free of charge).
"
9 E.g., Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943).
' Waychoff v. Waychoff, 309 Pa. 300, 163 AtI. 670 (1932); Midland Credit Adjustment
Co. v. Donnelley, 219 fll.App. 271 (1920) (contract held void).
' Depew v. Wichita Ass'n of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P.2d 1041 (1935). It has even
been held that a non-profit lay association may not perform legal services for members.
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 InI. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935).
But cf. Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F.Supp. 526 (D. Mass., 1939).
And consult Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility,
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Implicit in such decisions is the proposition that the supplying of profes-
sional services through others amounts to the practice of the profession.
22
Thus, they suggest that whenever the agency acts as intermediary between
the creditor and the attorney by controlling the attorney's selection, compen-
sation or activities, or whenever the agency exercises its own discretion in
settling or compromising claims of others, or in determining whether legal
proceedings should be instituted, unauthorized practice is likely to be found.23
In other words, one who may not practice law directly may not do so indi-
rectly through the employment of a lawyer to practice for him.2 4
In conclusion, it will be noted that the judiciary has assumed a controlling
position in determining what is the permissible practice of law.25 Statutes and
2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 119 (1934). It has also been held that a corporate trust company may
not permit its employed attorneys to draft trusts when it is to act as fiduciary under the
instruments being drafted, since this is essentially the performing of legal services not for
itself, but for others. Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank of Little Rock, 224 Ark. 48,
273 S.W.2d 408 (1954). Consult also Steer v. Land Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 113
N.E.2d 763 (Ohio C.P., 1953) (corporation selling title opinions of its salaried lawyer em-
ployees).
'In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910) (lawyers); People v.
Dermatological Institute, 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (1908) (doctors). Cf. Rosenthal v.
Shepard Broadcasting Service, 299 Mass. 286, 12 N.E.2d 819 (1938) (radio program giving
legal advice).
'See State ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d 895
(1937); Matter of Shoe Manufacturer's Protective Ass'n, 295 Mass. 369, 3 N.E.2d 746
(1936). Consult Johnstone, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9; Otterbourg, Collection Agency Ac-
tivities: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Bar, 5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 35, 37-38
(1938) ; Brand, Unauthorized Practice Decisions 767 (1937). Statement of Principles, loc.
cit. supra note 5, at 105A provides inter alia: "It is improper for a collection agency: ...
(6) To assume authority on behalf of creditors to employ or terminate the services of an
attorney or to arrange the terms or compensation for such services. (7) To intervene be-
tween creditor and attorney in any manner which would control or exploit the services of
the attorney or which would direct those services in the interest of the agency. (8) To de-
mand or obtain in any manner a share of the proper compensation for services performed
by an attorney in collecting a claim, irrespective of whether or not the agency may have
previously attempted collection thereof." Consult also cases cited notes 20-22 supra.
, "As [a corporation] cannot practice law directly, it cannot indirectly by employing
competent lawyers to practice for it, as that would be an evasion which the law will not
tolerate." In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910). Similarly,
a lay person may not represent others by hiring a lawyer to do the legal work. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Clauson, 1 Ill.App.2d 140, 117 N.E.2d 321 (1953) (service to represent in con-
demnation proceedings) ; Stack v. P. G. Garage, 7 N.J. 118, 80 A.2d 545 (1951) (tax re-
duction service) ; Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E. 2d 27 (1943) (same);
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935)
(auto club).
The lawyer who is the subject of the improper hiring may himself incur a special type of
liability by taking part in collection practices which may be deemed "unethical." Consult
In re Disbarment of Dows, 168 Minn. 6, 209 N.W. 627 (1926); In re Swihart and Bran-
son, 42 S.D. 628, 177 N.Y. 364 (1920), both of which involve the simulation of legal process.
Consult, e.g., People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 I1. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931).
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regulations have had little influence.2 6 Indeed, it has been held that they
must be consistent with judicial decisions to be valid.2 7 Those non-legal groups
which achieve proficiency in specialized areas of the law will doubtless con-
tinue to assert the right to give service in those areas, but neither bar nor
bench seems prepared to yield much ground. Thus, collection agencies may
often run the risks inherent in proceedings brought by a jealous bar and
decided by unfriendly courts.
28
Federal and State Penal Statutes
Significant federal regulation has taken two forms. In 1888, Congress acted
to prohibit the use of the mails for the sending of matter which on its face
carries an imputation of bad credit,29 a practice which had been held permis-
sible under the prior statute.30 Thus, an envelope on which the words "Excel-
sior Collection Agency" are printed "in very large full-faced capital letters"
may be excluded from the mails.31 Also, some collection agency procedures
are likely to be designated "unfair methods of competition" by the Federal
Trade Commission.
32
"Some statutes merely prohibit practice of law by lay persons. E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat.
(1954) § 7-101. Others attempt a rough definition. E.g., Wis. Stat. (1955) § 256.30. Still
others enumerate specific practices of specific businesses as lawful or unauthorized. E.g.,
Minn. Stat. (1953) § 481.02.
'People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937).
' Understandably enough, laymen seem to avoid instituting court tests as to the legality
of their practices. The only case found in which a lay group sought a ruling with respect
to the legality of its activities is Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d
945 (1939).
'25 Stat. 188 (1888), 18 U.S.C.A. §1718 (1950): "All matter ... upon the envelope or
outside cover or wrapper of which, or any postal card upon which is written or printed or
otherwise impressed or apparent any delineation, epithet, term, or language of libelous ...
character, or calculated by the terms or manner or style of display and obviously intended
to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another, is nonmailable matter....
Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be
nonmailable... shall be fined.., or imprisoned...."
'Ex parte Doran, 32 Fed. 76 (D. Minn., 1887). The previous statute, 13 Stat. 507 (1865),
had been directed solely at obscene matter.
'United States v. Brown, 43 Fed. 135, 136 (C.C. Vt., 1890). The statute was also held
to be violated by the mailing of postcards which contained dunning communications and
threats of suit in United States v. Bayle, 40 Fed. 664 (E.D. Mo., 1889), and United States
v. Prendergast, 237 Fed. 410 (D. Ore., 1916).
'The FTC has recently acted to forestall the activities of several collectors in the Wash-
ington, D.C., area, who used "imposing looking names, seals, eagles, etc., obviously to delude
the ignorant debtor into believing that his shortcomings in meeting his obligations had finally
become the subject of official government inquiry and concern." 22 Unauthorized Practice
News, No. 2, at 57 (1956). See also 22 Unauthorized Practice News, No. 2, at 61 (1956),
reporting that the "Retail Board of Trade, Chicago" had been ordered by the FTC examiner
to stop using that name in its collection activities, the examiner holding that the name im-
plies that the concern is an organization of retailers. The agency thus "misrepresents that
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The imposition of criminal liability under state statutes will depend largely
on the particular wording of the statute and local enforcement policies.33
For example, extreme pressuring of the debtor by threats of violence, crim-
inal proceedings or exposure has been said to fall within common definitions
of assault,3 4 extortion,3 5 and blackmail.3 6 In similar circumstances prosecu-
tions for criminal libel37 and other misdemeanors3 8 have been sustained. The
existence of a just debt with few exceptions3 9 is not recognized as a defense.
Nevertheless, the paucity of reported cases suggests uneven enforcement
and perhaps total acceptance by local prosecutors of prevailing collection
practices. This situation is of course aggravated by the difficulty in drawing
a line between permissible and prohibited collection activity.
it is to the advantage of the debtor to answer inquiries from the company," it being a
"credit-rating agency."
It is perhaps noteworthy that collection of private debts on government property without
prior permission is forbidden by a federal regulation. 44 Code Fed. Regs. § 100.8 (Supp.,
1955), issued pursuant to 62 Stat. 281 (1948), 40 U.S.C.A. § 318a (1950). A collector was
recently fined $25.00 under this regulation for attempting to collect money from a borrower
at his place of work in the Health, Education and Welfare Department Building. U.S. v.
Sipple, 10 Consumer Finance Law Bull. 7 (1956) (Mun.Ct., D.C., 1955).
Compare, at two extremes, People v. Loveless, 84 N.Y.Supp. 1114 (N.Y. Spec.Sess.
Ct., 1903) (letter threatening to expose non-payment of a just debt held a misdemeanor
under statute making illegal the sending of letters whose effect is to cause annoyance) with
Barton v. State, 88 Tex.Crim.Rep. 368, 227 S.W. 317 (1921) (conviction for assault with
intent to commit robbery reversed, for the offense, blow with a pistol and intent to kill,
was not made out for lack of the requisite intent, since defendant "acted alone upon the
intent to collect the debt, which he in good faith believed to be owing").
' State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa 200 (1875) (threat to shoot with drawn revolver). But cf.
Barton v. State, 88 Tex.Crim.Rep. 368, 227 SW. 317 (1921).
' Cf. Weeber v. United States, 62 Fed. 740 (C.C. Colo., 1894) (federal statute). Consult
cases cited notes 38 and 39 infra. Cf. Slater v. Taylor, 31 App.D.C. 100 (1908), where it
was held in a suit for false imprisonment that defendant had just cause to procure plaintiff's
arrest for extortion when plaintiff posted numerous cards conspicuously on plaintiff's door
with the purpose of coercing payment of a sum claimed to be due.
' See State v. Richards, 97 Wash. 587, 589, 167 Pac. 47, 48 (1917). The court stated that
"[tihe law does not countenance forceful and unlawful collection even of just debts. ...
[O]ne can commit... [blackmail] though he is of the opinion that the money thus sought
is actually due him."
' Cf. State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395, 16 S.W. 604 (1891) (creditor liable for agency's
exposure of debtor's financial circumstances to employer).
' People v. Loveless, 84 N.Y.Supp. 1114 (N.Y. Spec.Sess.Ct., 1903) (sending letter which
causes annoyance a misdemeanor); State v. McCabe, 135 Mo. 450 (1896) (members of
collection agency which sent letter threatening to publicize the indebtedness held liable un-
der statute making it a misdemeanor maliciously to threaten injury to credit and reputa-
tion).
'See Barton v. State, 88 Tex.Crim.Rep. 368, 227 S.W. 317 (1921), and State v. Ham-
mond, 80 Ind. 80 (1881) (no liability under very broad statute notwithstanding threat to
prosecute debtor for obtaining money under false pretenses).
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Civil Liability
The great bulk of litigation involving debt collection practices is of a civil
nature. In the older cases, tort liability was in the main based upon defama-
tion, except in the rare instance where some other long-accepted theory could
be construed to cover the practice in question.40 Today, however, recognition
of the torts of invasion of the right of privacy and intentional infliction of
mental anguish has considerably broadened the scope of a collector's civil
liability.
Defamation. Whether or not a communication is defamatory per se,41 in a
great majority of states truth of the publication is recognized as a complete
defense.42 Hence a collector who can demonstrate the existence of a legally
enforceable debt need not ordinarily fear liability from a publication of the
amount of the debt due. But a correlative imputation that the debtor is not
worthy of credit may be defamatory, for the fact that a debt is outstanding
does not necessarily establish unworthiness of credit as true.43 On the other
hand, the reporting of a delinquent debtor to his employer 44 or to a mutual
'The clear-cut torts such as assault and battery for which the agency might be held
liable will not be discussed herein.
"The significance of defamation per se is that no special damages need be shown,
whereas otherwise such proof is essential to recovery. With respect to collection cases, per
se classification seems to turn on whether or not the person to whom bad credit is imputed
is injured wit respect to his economic livelihood by the imputation. Yelle v. Cowles Pub-
lishing Co., 46 Wash.2a 105, 278 P.2d 671 (1955) (credit important to plaintiff, actionable
per se) ; Hudson v. Slack Furniture Co., 318 Il.App. 15, 47 N.E.2d 502 (1943) (telegrapher
not libeled per se by publication of false wage assignment); Liebel v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 103 Mont. 370, 62 P.2d 667 (1936) (stenographer's pursuit of occupation not
jeopardized by statement "your credit is no good"; thus statement not slanderous per se).
" Consult Prosser, Torts §96 (1955) ; Rest., Torts §582, Comment A (1938).
"Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 167 N.W. 584 (1918). Defendant caused to be published
by a "trust book and credit company" an item charging plaintiff with refusal to pay a debt
and rating him a poor credit risk. The court stated: "It is contended that the publication
was true. In its literal interpretation we may assume ... this ... right but in the broader
scope and purpose of the publication it is not shown to be true. It may be true that the
plaintiff owed the defendant a sum of money.., but it is not true or shown to be true that
the plaintiff was not worthy of credit. . . ." Ibid., at 326-27, 586. Consult also Crellin v.
Thomas, 247 P.2d 264 (Utah, 1952) (if persistent misconduct is imputed, proof of a single
instance does not suffice) ; White v. White, 129 Va. 621, 106 S.E. 350 (1921) (proof of
partial truth of the imputation is ineffective). Indeed, defense of truth may be dangerous,
for the jury may be permitted to find that defendant has reiterated the defamation, and in-
crease the damages accordingly. Hall v. Edwards, 138 Me. 231, 23 A.2d 889 (1942).
" Dickinson v. Hathaway, 122 La. 644, 48 So. 136 (1909). But in Miller v. Howe, 245 Ky.
568, 53 S.W.2d 938 (1932), a "mere collecting agent" was held not to have an interest
sufficient to justify a privilege. Several cases have found liability in libel when the com-
munication was peculiarly obnoxious or other factors were present. Vail v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 103 N.J.L. 213, 136 Atl. 425 (1927) (letter untrue) ; Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 114 Iowa
358, 86 N.W. 377 (1901) (additional charge of cowardice); Brown v. Vanneman, 85 Wis.
451, 55 N.W. 183 (1893) (charge of general bad credit) ; Over v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 191, 26
N.E. 91 (1885) (additional charge of "lying"). Consult also cases cited note 66 infra.
1957]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
credit organization is usually privileged,45 as are all communications which
concern subjects with which the writer has a legitimate interest when made
to another who has a corresponding interest.46 The privilege is conditional
only, and is lost if the publication is made in bad faith or as a mere cloak to
coerce payment. 47
A minority of states require justification for the publication even if truth-
fulness is established.48 Under this view the collector is of course more suscep-
tible to liability. Thus, for example, it has been held that a tax collector is
responsible for libel for "maliciously" proclaiming publicly, by publishing
notices in newspapers, that the debtor had not paid his taxes, which notices
were in addition to the notice required by statute.49
Invasion of the right of privacy. Most courts which have expressly con-
sidered the question now recognize the existence of a right of privacy, invasion
of which will give rise to a cause of action to recover damages.50 This com-
paratively new and as yet ill-defined tort 5' has occasionally resulted in the
'Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, 194 F.2d 160 (App.D.C., 1952); Hooper-
Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102 (C.A. 5th, 1947); Diamond v. Krasnow, 136 Pa.
Super.Ct, 68, 7 A.2d 65 (1939); Ideal Motor Co. v. Warfield, 211 Ky. 576, 277 S.W. 862
(1925) ; Putnal v. Inman, 76 Fla. 553, 80 So. 316 (1918) ; Woodhouse v. Pawles, 43 Wash.
617, 86 Pac. 1063 (1906). The privilege terminates when general publication is made to sub-
scribers who do not have an apparent, present interest in the report. Hanschke v. Mer-
chants' Credit Bureau, 256 Mich. 272, 239 N.W. 318 (1931); King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L.
417, 9 AtI. 705 (1887). Consult Evans, Legal Immunity for Defamation, 24 Minn. L. Rev.
607, 618 (1940).
"Prosser, Torts §95 (1955).
-"'Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919) ; Hartnett v. Goddard, 176 Mass.
326, 57 N.E. 677 (1900); Traynor v. Sieloff, 62 Minn. 420, 64 N.W. 915 (1895).
'5E.g., N.D. Const.Art. I, §9; Hutchins v. Page, 75 N.H. 215, 72 At. 689 (1909) (com-
mon law); Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 118 N.W. 1071 (1908) (special statute).
" Hutchins v. Page, 75 N.H. 215, 72 Atl. 689 (1909).
'For a compilation of states which are undecided, or have affirmatively recognized or
denied the existence of the right, consult Prosser, Torts 636-37 (1955). Very recently a
few modifications of that compilation have become necessary. Thus, in Housh v. Peth, 165
Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956), the highest court of Ohio affirmed prior decisions of
lower Ohio courts that the right exists in that state. Also, a recent dictum of the Iowa
Supreme Court recognizes the right in that state. Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing
Co., - Iowa -, -, 76 N.W.2d 762, 765 (1956). On the other hand, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court in Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955), dis-
affirmed the existence of the right in no uncertain terms, and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reaffirmed its position in Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269
N.W. 295 (1936), of refusing to recognize the right. Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75
N.W.2d 925 (1956). Thus, at the moment the right is recognized in one form or another in
twenty states, Alaska and the District of Columbia, and expressly rejected in only four,
while three states limit the right by statute. The minority states are Wisconsin, Nebraska,
Rhode Island (Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 AtI. 97 [19091), and Texas (Milner
v. Red River Valley Pub]. Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 [Tex.Civ.App., 1952], and McCullagh v.
Houston Chronicle Publ. Co., 211 F.2d 4 [C.A. 5th, 1954]). For the historical background of
,the right see Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, 116 F.Supp. 538, 542-43 (D. Conn., 1953).
'The original statement of the right's confines was very comprehensive indeed: "[T]he
protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of
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imposition of civil liability for collection activities. Of major significance, in
contradistinction to defamation, is that malice is immaterial and truth is no
defense to the new tort.52
Dean Prosser divides the tort into four distinct categories, one of which
involves intrusion upon one's "physical solitude or seclusion. '53 Thus, collec-
tors have been held liable for excessive telephoning of the debtor54 or for one
call in the middle of the night.55 Recovery might also be based on tapping of
the debtor's telephone wires,5 6 entering into his quarters,57 shadowing him, 58
writing or of threats, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of
the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the
right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be
maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be defamed.... The principle which protects per-
sonal writings... not only against theft ... but against publication in any form, is in
reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality." Warren
and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 205 (1890). Recovery has even
been based upon the "happiness" clause of a state constitution. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.
App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931). Cf. Quina v. Roberts, 16 So.2d 558 (La., 1944) (very broad
statute).
"Personal ill-will is not an ingredient of the offense, any more than in ordinary case of
trespass to person or to property." Warren and Brandeis, op. cit. supra note 51, at 218;
Lewis v. Physician's & Dentist's Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash.2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
But see Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So.2d 635 (1947), for an intimation that malice
may be shown as an alternative to substantial injury in proving damages, once an invasion
has been established, and Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956), to the
effect that proof of malice to sustain collection of exemplary damages is allowed. Further-
more, truth is no defense. Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky., 1951); Davis v. Gen-
eral Finance & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga.App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950). Similarly, mistake is of
no import. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal.App.2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942). But cf.
Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corp., supra.
Consult Prosser, Torts 637 et seq. (1955).
'Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (one factor). In Wiggins v.
Moskins Credit Clothing Store, 137 F.Supp. 764 (E.D. S.C., 1956), it was held that if the
creditor's agent annoyed the landlady of the debtor by repeated phone cals at her home
over a three-month period, and the agent on occasion used "abusive, vile and opprobrious
language," the agent invaded the proprietary interest of the landlady in her home by con-
duct tantamount to a nuisance, and the creditor would be liable to the landlady for the
resultant mental and emotional disturbance. Cf. Brillhardt v. Ben Tipp, Inc., 48 Wash.2d
722, 297 P.2d 232 (1956) (nuisance).
' See Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 796, 216 P.2d 571, 573 (1950) (inflic-
tion of mental anguish, but indicating recovery could as well have been based on the theory
of privacy).
'McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.App. 92, 2 SXE.2d 810 (1939);
Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931). Cf. Schmukkler v. Ohio Bell Tel.
Co., 116 N.E.2d 819 (C.P. Ohio, 1953) (privilege of telephone company to monitor calls).
But cf. Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D. N.Y., 1953) (party to
conversation who recorded it and later broadcast it held not liable).
W elsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (entry by a landlord) ; Walker
v. Whittle, 83 Ga.App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (entry by an officer).
' Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, - La. -, 88 So.2d 716 (1956). Cf. Schultz v. Frank-
fort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913) (shadow-
ing held defamatory).
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investigating the debtor's bank account,59 serving an unauthorized order to
produce certain documents6" and similar activity.
Most collection cases fall into Prosser's category involving the placing
before the public of private information which, although true, "violates the
common decencies. "61 Here, liability has been found for the creditor's placing
in his store window a large sign advertising the debtor's non-payment,62
publication in a newspaper of a past-due bill,63 sending of unsealed letters
addressed to the debtor to the homes of his friends demanding payment,
64
and telephoning of the debtor concerning the debt at his neighbor's home. 65
In sum, publication by the creditor or collection agency of the fact that the
debtor has not paid his -bills may constitute an invasion of the debtor's
privacy.
There may be, however, some limitations to recovery under the publication
rule. Several cases suggest that the exposure must be to the public generally
or at least to a large number of persons.66 Nevertheless, privacy would seem
to be violated by any revelation of the existence of the debt without regard to
the number of persons to whom this fact is communicated. The injury to the
debtor may be less, but it nonetheless exists.
It may also be argued, by analogy to the law of defamation, that publica-
tion of the fact of the debt by one with a legitimate interest in the matter to
another with a comparable interest should be privileged. 67 Under this view,
' Cf. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 At. 34 (1929).
' Cf. Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J. Eq. 481, 58 A.2d 86 (1948).
' This is Dean Prosser's fourth category. The second category consists in appropriation
of an element of plaintiff's personality, as his picture, and subjecting it to commercial uses.
A third group of cases involves a putting of plaintiff before the public in a false, although
not defamatory, manner, for instance by signing his name to a public telegram which at-
tributes to him views he does not hold. These latter categories will not ordinarily involve
the collector.
In collection cases the unwarranted publicity aspect is generally more strongly empha-
sized than the intrusion upon solitude and perhaps a more extraordinary case of abuse will
be required to admit of recovery without the additional factor of publicity. To the effect
that conduct, reasonable betwqen the parties, may be unreasonable when published to third
parties, see McKinzie v. Huckaby, 112 F.Suop. 642 (W.D. Okla., 1953).
' Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) ; Thompson v. Adelberg & Ber-
man, 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (1918).
Trammel v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
Cf. Cyran v. Finlay Straus, Inc., 302 N.Y. 486, 99 N.E. 2d 298 (1951) (debt had already
been paid, recovery had for libel).
"'See Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950) (intentional in-
fliction of mental anguish, the court stating its view that the right of privacy was also
invaded).
Consult Lucas v. Moskins Stores, 262 S.W.2d 679 (Ky., 1953); Voneye v. Turner,
240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky., 1951); Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind.App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948);
Lewis v. Physician's & Dentist's Credit Bureau, 27 Wash.2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
" Consult Warren and Brandeis, op. cit. supra note 51, at 217. Rest., Torts §867, Com-
ment C (1939), suggests an analogy to the "fair comment" defamation cases. Consult Col-
lection Methods, 26 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 347 (1953).
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a letter to a credit association is conditionally privileged.0 8 Communication to
the debtor's employer has been held to be similarly protected.69 However, it
may be questioned whether or not the employer has any interest different
from that of the public generally. At best, the employer may show concern
over his employee's welfare, discharge financially unstable employees, or
perhaps give them a raise. Similarly, any stranger may show interest in the
welfare of his fellow humans, disassociate himself from the irresponsible, and
give to the needy. The usual rationale-expenses of a possible garnishment
suit-hardly seems weighty. Moreover, from the creditor's point of view, a
publication to the debtor's employer would seem to be based on a feeling that
such will tend to coerce payment, presumably by -threat of discharge,70 and
might therefore be held "unwarranted" or "oppressive." Thus, extension of a
privilege allowing communication of the fact of a debt to the debtor's em-
ployer would appear unjustified.
Intentional infliction of mental anguish. Creditors and their agencies have
often been held liable in damages for the intentional infliction of mental
anguish. The earliest such case involved an undertaker's delay in cremation
to coerce payment of a bill, and has become a leading case. 71 Other cases on
their facts seem analogous, but were decided on long-accepted theories.72 At
present, the independent tort is generally recognized, although limited to cases
of "outrageous" conduct. 73 There is also a definite trend away from the
Cases cited note 45 supra.
Cases cited note 66 supra, none of which, however, expressly mentioned a privilege in
these terms. Also consult cases in note 44 supra.
,' Consult La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934):
"Our company wasn't having men working for us who had their salaries garnisheed, and
if in case he had anything like that, we would have to do one thing or the other, either pay
the bills or have to dismiss him." Ibid. at 460, 425.
Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925).
'2 Those courts which seek to avoid overt acceptance of the new tort reach the same result
by finding some other technical tort, after which damages are recovered for mental suffer-
ing as well as for the technical breach. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340
(1956) (invasion of right of privacy); Manning v. Kennedy, 320 fll.App. 11, 49 N.E.2d
658 (1943) (conspiracy) ; Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal.2d 109, 130 P.2d 389 (1942) (battery);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935) (trespass to land);
Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga.App. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933) (technical assault); Salis-
bury v. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 Pac. 315 (1918) (false imprisonment); Whitsel v. Watts,
98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916) (technical assault); Shellabarger v. Morris, 119 Mo.App.
566, 91 S.W. 1005 (1905) (nuisance).
" Consult Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40 (1956). Ohio is the only state
which, having recently considered the matter, still absolutely refuses to recognize this tort.
Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948). A similar view was taken in
Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953), but that case was very
strongly criticized in Green, "Mental Suffering" Inflicted by Loan Sharks No Wrong, 31
Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1953), and was modified in Duty v. General Finance Company, 154
Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). The Restatement of Torts considerably liberalized its po-
sition in the 1948 supplement, and now takes the view that: "One who, without a privilege
to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emo-
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requirement of some physical injury before damages for mental suffering are
permitted.74
Collection practices of a wide variety have been held, either singly or in
combination, sufficiently "outrageous" to constitute the intentional infliction
of mental anguish. Broadly speaking, such practices fall into two categories:
those which directly disrupt the debtor's peace of mind and those which do
so indirectly, through the economic and social pressure of others. The first
type of harassment has taken the form of an excessive number of demanding
communications, 75 and threats to blacklist, 76 garnishee wages, 77 exercise self
help,78 institute criminal proceedings79 or reveal the non-payment to employ-
ers80 or neighbors. 81 The use of abusive and vulgar language and accusations
of bad character in the making of such communications or threats is also
relevant. 82 The second group of proscribed activities comprehends actual
tional distress and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it." Rest., Torts §46 (Supp., 1948).
The limitation of the requirement of outrageous conduct is dictated by aversion to trivial
litigation over minor annoyances. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the
Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936). Also, when the annoyance or insult is petty,
there is a conspicuous lack of assurance that there has been any mental suffering. Thus, pro-
fanity and abuse alone do not ordinarily give rise to a cause of action. Ex parte Hammett,
259 Ala. 240, 66 So.2d 600 (1953). See further cases cited by Prosser, supra, at 45-66.
"'State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 283 (1952) ; Quina
v. Roberts, 16 So.2d 558 (La., 1944). Perhaps an increasing recognition that mental and
emotional disturbances are actually physical injuries themselves has been influential in this
change. Consult Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1944); Earangey, The Legal Consequences of Shock,
2 Medico-Leg. & Crim. Rev. 14 (1934). See also Davidson v. Lee, 139 S.W. 904 (Tex.Civ.
App., 1911).
Concerning mere negligent infliction of mental anguish as giving rise to liability consult
Prosser, op. cit. supra note 73, at 54 et seq., and Gregory, Toelle and Sykes, The Interest
in Freedom from Mental Disturbance, 27 Conn. B.J. 65 (1953), discussing Urban v. Hart-
ford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.2d 292 (1952) (allowing such recovery although per-
haps recklessness was involved). Examples of the nearly unanimous view that wilful conduct
is required are Espisona v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal.App.2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1953), and
Zabron v. Cunard Steamship Co., 151 Iowa 345, 131 N.W. 18 (1911).
1 La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934). Cf. Clark
v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (App. D.C., 1939) (threatening letters to
plaintiff known to be ill).
"Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
Ibid.
SDigsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga.App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948). Cf. Peoples
Finance & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 183 Okla. 413, 82 P.2d 994 (1938) (threat to repossess
household furniture, including pregnant woman's bed).
"Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936). Cf. Quina v.
Roberts, 16 So.2d 558 (La., 1944) (simulation of legal documents).
soBarnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932).
"Cf. Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).
"IDigsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga.App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948) ; Kirby v. Jules
Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936); Barnett v. Collection Service Co.,
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revelation of the debtor's financial circumstances to his family,8 3 neighbors,8 4
employer,8 5 credit associations8 6 and the public generally.8 7 Similarly included
are the more indirect modes of publicity, such as sending threatening post-
cards,8 8 telegrams,8 9 letters on the envelopes of which are cleverly worded
and depicted indications of the letter's purpose,90 or leaving handbills or
notices in and around the debtor's residence.91
The collection method utilized in a particular instance is not the sole
determinant in the imposition of tort liability. The collector's activities may
be desultory or oft-repeated. The debtor may be a widow, 92 pregnant woman93
or wife at home alone.9 4 The amount due may be extremely small95 or perhaps
not owing at all.96 Finally, the collector may be a mere creditor, or an agency
making a business out of the collection of debts.9 7
214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.V. 25 (1932) (coarse, vindictive letters to widow). In the Digsby
case it was also alleged that this agent used such language as "lasciviously" to suggest that
"if he could not get the money any other way he was going to 'take it out in trade,' mean-
ing he was going to have sexual intercourse with petitioner," simply "adding insult to in-
jury." Supra, at 660, 206.
'Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.V.2d 64 (1954).
"Bowden v. Spiegel, 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950); La Salle Extension Uni-
versity v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
1 Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) ; Quina v. Roberts,
16 So.2d 558 (La., 1944); La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253
N.W. 424 (1934).
**Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
8 American Security Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga.App. 723, 176 S.E. 798 (1934) (kicking at front
door, kicking in screen of back door, cursing plaintiff in presence of others).
SDuty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
Ibid.
'LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) (lurid
envelopes, one of which bore a facsimile of lightning about to strike).
"' Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.V.2d 64 (1954).
'Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932).
'Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 183 Okla. 413, 82 P.2d 994 (1938).
" Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga.App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948).
'E.g., Qnina v. Roberts, 16 So.2d 558 (La., 1944) ($1.45).
"When the debt is not legally collectible, the outrageousness seems more gross, and lia-
bility more likely to ensue. Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.V. 25
(1932) (defendant "should have known" the debt could not legally be collected) ; La Salle
Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) (plaintiff sued to re-
cover the amount allegedly due; held not collectible); Maze v. Employee's Loan Soc., 217
Ala. 44, 114 So. 574 (1927) (contested amount).
I When defendant is a creditor corporation it seems to fare no better than a collection
agency. But a private creditor may be viewed with more compassion by the courts. In
McKinzie v. Huckaby, 112 F.Supp. 642 (W.D. Okla., 1953), the creditor brought a police-
man, who stayed in the creditor's car, and plaintiff was so disturbed that he became ill. The
court refused to find liability, because defendant had no knowledge of any "peculiar sus-
ceptibility of mental strain."
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It may be suggested that collectors have in many instances been held liable
for something less than the "outrageous" conduct generally stated to be re-
quired. Thus, mere insults, threats and accusations do not ordinarily give rise
to civil recovery. 98 Furthermore, there is surely a legal right or at least a
privilege to make some extra-judicial attempt at collecting outstanding claims,
even if done in bad grace.
Three explanations may be suggested for this phenomenon. First, some-
thing less than "outrageousness" has been required by many courts where
there have been physical injuries, for the outrage requirement is in part based
on the fear that the annoyance may be trivial, a fear unjustified in the face
of physical injury.9 9 There is, however, little empirical support for this ex-
planation, since most collection cases finding liability involve only mental
suffering. Alternatively, it will be noted that the major purpose of the col-
lector in pressuring the debtor may be a desire to cause anxiety and thereby
hasten payment of the debt. Thus, if the collector has created mental suffer-
ing, he has only succeeded in doing exactly what he intended to accom-
plish. 00 Finally, it has been stated that the outrageous character of an act
arises "not so much from what is done as from the abuse by the defendant
of some relation with the plaintiff or some position which gives him actual or
apparent authority over the plaintiff or power to damage his interest."''1 By
and large, this view would appear to be an apt explanation for the many
recoveries against collectors based upon the intentional infliction of mental
anguish. 1
0 2
The new tort? It is apparent that the theories upon which the collector may
be held liable in tort overlap to a considerable degree. If the collection activ-
ities are directed solely at the debtor, both invasion of the right of privacy
I Consult Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40 passim (1956), and discussion
in note 73 supra.
Consult discussion in note 73 supra.*
"® Consult La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934);
Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932).
'
1Prosser, op. cit. supra not 98, at 45. "The principle is much the same as that under-
lying our criminal statutes on extortion and blackmail, or the common law liability for
abuse of process." Ibid.
"n Similar liability has been imposed upon evicting landlords who behave outrageously,
as by tearing up the premises, smoking out tenants, or screaming abuse. Richardson v. Prid-
more, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 217 P.2d 113 (1950); Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 198
P.2d 696(1948). Likewise, bullying activity of insurance adjusters leads to liability. E.g.,
Interstate Life and Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga.App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937). To the
same effect are: National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 187 Okla. 180, 102 P.2d 141
(1940) ; Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tetirick, Gdn., 185 Okla. 37, 89 P.2d 774 (1938) ; Conti-
nental Casualty Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935). Cf. Johnson v. Sampson,
167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926); Janvier v. Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316; Curnett v.
Wolff, 244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915 (1953) (threat to have plaintiff discharged if he did not
dismiss a suit).
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and intentional infliction of mental anguish may result. Or, if the collector
resorts to the aid of others, the two sorts last mentioned and defamation may
be found. Furthermore, any attempt to distinguish the theories applicable to
either situation would seem difficult. In the former instance, there is an intru-
sion upon the debtor in order to disturb his peace of mind. In the latter,
there is a publication revealing the debtor's financial affairs intended to cause
anxiety which also carries with it an imputation of poor credit. It is thus not
surprising that defamation, the right of privacy and freedom from mental
suffering are used almost interchangeably when the liability of collectors is
in issue. If, for example, one of these theories is not recognized in a particular
jurisdiction, a case which most appropriately falls under that theory is likely
to be decided on an alternative basis. Such has happened, for example, in
Wisconsin, 10 3 Ohio,' 4 Texas' 0 5 and Nebraska.'"0 Similarly, cases falling
analytically closer to one theory are often decided under another.
In sum, the tort liability of collectors presently rests on an amorphous and
doctrinally unsatisfying body of law. It may be suggested that eventually
one existing theory may absorb all,'0 7 or that a new and independent theory
dealing only with collectors will be developed, much as has been done in
regard to common carriers. Under either alternative, analysis would be pro-
moted, certainty increased, and progress made toward isolating the real issues.
However, neither alternative seems probable. Instead, it may be expected that
liability will continue to rest on several theories, in large measure dependent
upon the available precedents. Nor is this situation particularly undesirable.
Given a sympathetic court, the flexibility today possible would seem well
suited to a just accommodation of the sometime conflicting interests of collec-
tors and debtors in regard to the collection of debts.
"0 Compare Yoekel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956) (no right of pri-
vacy), with Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537,
139 N.V. 386 (1913) (defamation).
", Compare Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (right of privacy),
with Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948) (no intentional infliction of
mental anguish).
" Compare Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (intentional
infliction of mental anguish), with Milner v. Red River Valley Publ. Co., 249 S.W.2d 227
(Tex.Civ.App., 1952) (no right of privacy).
"Oe Compare La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934)
(intentional infliction of mental anguish), with Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb.
519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955) (no right of privacy).
"o' Thus, Dean Prosser suggests that when the tort of intentional infliction of mental
anguish becomes fully developed "the great majority of privacy cases may... be absorbed
into it." Prosser, Torts 639 (1955).
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